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ABSTRACT
Ethical values of business are normally jeopardized by the stiff competitions 
among them. Thus, ownership structure plays vital roles to balance these 
issues. This paper aims to study the relationship between ownership 
structures and performance pre and post Malaysian Codes on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) 2012 revision. Based on a random sampling of 100 
Bursa Malaysia listed companies, a final of 500 firm-year observations 
were chosen for the duration of 2010 till 2014. This study engaged several 
univariate and multivariate analyses to serve the empirical evidence. 
Despite the better Corporate Governance practices among the sample 
companies, the multivariate results showed that family ownership, 
government ownership, institutional ownership and company size have 
significant and positive relationship with firm performance only for MCCG 
2012 revision. Due to the unfavorable Malaysian stock market for both 2013 
and 2014, the results of post MCCG 2012 revision showed an insignificant 
effect between ownership structures and firm performance. Even though 
the corporate governance practices were favorably reported, the ownership 
structures were still powerless to influence the firm performance.
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introDuction
The issue of business ethics has garnered an increased amount of attention. 
Several corporate watchdog groups highlighted that the number of 
corporations that engage in ethics training and initiate socially responsive 
programs has amplified noticeably. Businesses have seen numerous instances 
of stock price pumping through corporate downsizing, penalizing actions 
against whistleblowers, and other practices that point to a still-prevalent 
emphasis on the bottom line over all other considerations in many industries. 
The ethical choices of firms on whether to use inferior materials, to place 
employees in a poor working environment, or to lay off a dozen workers 
due to financial expenditures are frequently reported. Indeed, the force to 
make morally compromised choices on behalf of the company may be at 
stake. The increased struggle of businesses that are based less on values are 
increasingly facing an uncomforting conflict between their social values 
and their bottom line. Maximising financial returns to shareholders are at 
times conflicting with the charity for social responsibility. In addition to 
this, sacrifices are business misconducts that insert more pressure for the 
managers to the eyes of shareholders.
The collapsed of big corporations such as the UK’s Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI), Enron, and World Com are examples 
of high profile corporate scandals that received worldwide public scrutiny. 
These corporate scandals tarnished the reputation of companies and board of 
directors, causing the impairment of investors’ confidence. The emergence 
of these high profile corporate scandals has brought the importance of good 
corporate governance into the limelight (Hussin & Othman, 2012).Financial 
crisis in Asia has drawn the attention of public about the weaknesses of 
corporate governance practices in developing economies such as Malaysia 
(Zainal Abidin & Ahmad, 2007). Corporate governance transformation is 
crucial for companies to adapt the corporate governance structures that suit 
the changes in the external environment.
Malaysia is not excluded from the corporate governance issue. 
Corporate governance practices in Malaysia have also been criticized by the 
public due to several high profile corporate scandals such as Perwaja Steel, 
Renong, UEM and Transmile Group Bhd. These corporate scandals have 
impaired the investors’ confidence in the Malaysian capital market and most 
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companies involved have been collapsed due to financial and reputation 
losses. Poor corporate governance practices serve as a main reason for cases 
of corporate scandals in Malaysia (Wahab, How & Verhoeven, 2007). The 
downfall of Transmile Bhd is a manipulation of revenue which reflects poor 
transparency in financial reporting (Daud, 2012).
The Securities Commission (SC) of Malaysia has played its roles in 
promoting good corporate governance practices, especially among public 
listed companies to restore the public confidence via the implementation of 
a series of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) which were 
first issued in 2000, revised in 2007 and followed by the second revision in 
2012. The MCCG outlines the principles and best practices of structures and 
processes that firms could practice in their operations towards achieving an 
optimal governance framework. In addition, Bursa Malaysia has also played 
its roles in ensuring good corporate governance practices by imposing a 
mandatory requirement for Malaysian public listed companies to comply 
with the requirements set in MCCG. Tan Sri Zarinah Anwar, who is the 
former chairman of Securities Commissions Malaysia, suggested that the 
boards and the shareholders must have a wider comprehension that good 
business is not only measured by good financial position, but also by an 
upright ethical and sustainable position. Despite the efforts taken to enhance 
corporate governance practices in Malaysia, the effectiveness of these 
MCCGs remains questionable as corporate scandals still occur after the 
issuance of MCCGs. Hence, “Does good corporate governance practices 
really lead to good financial performance?” (Daud, 2012).
The purpose of this study therefore is to examine the level of corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia before and after the issuance of MCCG 
2012 revision. In addition, this study also examines one of the corporate 
governance tools which is the ownership structures and its effect on 
corporate performance pre and post MCCG 2012 revision. The findings of 
this study could be to assess the effectiveness of MCCG 2012 in its effort 
to promote better corporate governance practices in Malaysia. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews 
related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
research methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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literature revieW anD hypotheses
family ownership and firm performance 
It is mandatory for all public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia to 
disclose family relationships among their directors in the board and any 
family relationships with the major shareholders in their annual reports. 
This is regarded as a vital disclosure since the majority of the Malaysian 
public listed companies are family concentrated ownership (Claessens, 
2000). Mohd Ghazali (2010) showed that 67.2 % of his 238 Malaysian 
sample companies are family owned. He added that family relationships 
among board members in Malaysia were 73 percent out of all the public 
listed companies in Malaysia. Despite an increase in family ownership 
companies in Malaysia, there are only a few studies that examined the 
relationship between family members on the board and firm performance. 
Chrisman (2004) studied the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance and found that non-family companies performed better than 
family companies due to altruism practices. Non-performing management 
would still be in their position despite of bad performance due to the unique 
family relationship among directors in the board and major shareholders. 
However, Maury (2006) found that family ownership could reduce the 
agency conflict between management and shareholders which can contribute 
to good performance.  Hence, the following exploratory hypothesis has 
been developed in terms of relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance upon the revision of MCCG 2012;
H1: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and 
firm performances after the 2012 MCCG revision
managerial ownership and firm performance  
Managerial ownership refers to the portion of shares in the company 
that is owned by the manager and directors. It is disclosed in the annual report 
as a director shareholding. The disclosure of director shareholding is very 
important as it is part of a director’s compensation. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) found that higher managerial ownership or director ownership is able 
to reduce the agency problem and hence increase the firm’s performance. 
The director is motivated to act in the best interest of shareholders when 
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the director is also part of the shareholder entitled for dividend return 
based on the shares owned. However, Chiang and Chia (2005) found a 
negative association between director ownership and firm performances. 
Shareholding directors tend to act conservatively in making corporate or 
business decision in order to secure their managerial position. MCCG 
2012 recommended the board to maintain an effective communication 
with shareholders via the company’s website as part of disclosure. This 
effective communication can reduce agency conflict between management 
and shareholders. Based on the results found by previous researchers, 
the relationship between director’s ownership and firm performances is 
expected. Hence, the following hypothesis has been developed;
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance after the 2012 MCCG revision
managerial ownership and firm performance  
Government ownership refers to the portion of shares in the company 
that is owned by the government through its government agencies. 
Government ownership needs to be disclosed in the annual report through 
the disclosure of substantial shareholders. The government usually owns 
shares of companies that have significant impact to the public such as 
utilities services and public infrastructures. According to Claessens (2000), 
companies with government ownership may perform poorly due to the 
priority of the government agenda such as political policy rather than to 
maximize profit. This is however in contrast to Mohd Ghazali (2010) who 
found a positive relationship between government ownership and firm 
performances. The positive association is due to the favorable treatment 
given by the government to the government linked companies in making 
or revising government policies. In Malaysia, most of the government 
arms that own shares in certain public listed companies are for example the 
Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). 
Government owned companies normally receive government grants as 
part of the financing of projects that are beneficial to the public as a whole. 
Based on the results found by previous researchers, it shows that there is a 
relationship between government ownership and firm performances. Hence, 
the following hypothesis has been developed for the relationship between 
government ownership and firm performance;
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H3: There is a significant relationship between government ownership 
and firm performance after the 2012 MCCG revision
institutional ownership and firm performance  
Institutional ownership refers to the ownership by institutional 
shareholders who are professionals and experts in investment activities. 
These institutional shareholders normally have voting powers and rights 
based on their shareholdings and able to influence the management’s 
decision as well as to monitor the management behaviors. According to 
Hsu and Wang (2014) who studied on the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and firm performance based on the Taiwanese stock market, 
they found a positive relationship as higher institutional ownership will 
lead to a better firm performance as these institutional shareholders were 
able to monitor the management behaviors effectively and hence reducing 
the conflict of interest between management and shareholders. They added 
that long term institutional shareholding by foreign institutions will lead to 
a higher firm performance. The positive association between institutional 
ownership and firm performance has been further supported by the findings 
from Desoky and Mousa (2013) and Alipour (2013), who found a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance based 
on their respective studies in different stock market environments. This 
implies the ability of institutional shareholders in reducing the information 
asymmetry problem which leads to the increase of the shareholders’ wealth. 
Based on the results found by previous researchers, it is shown that there 
is a relationship between institutional ownership and firm performances. 
Hence, the following hypothesis has been developed for the relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm performance;
H4: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm performance after the 2012 MCCG revision
company size and firm performance  
Company size is one of the company’s characteristics that differentiate 
one company from another. Company size can be measured through the total 
assets owned, firm profitability and market capitalization. Larger companies 
normally have a strong ability for going concern due to sufficient resources 
63
Ethical ValuEs and compEtitiVEnEss
owned by them while the smaller companies with limited resources tend to 
concentrate on low risk projects as they do not have the strong ability for 
going concern compared to larger companies. Hence, the company size can 
affect the firm’s performances. This has been supported by prior studies that 
examined the relationship between company size and firm performances. 
Larger companies could perform better compared to smaller companies 
due to the ability of larger companies to engage in high risk projects for 
high returns (Haji, 2014). However, Mohd Ghazali (2010) found a negative 
association between company size and firm performance whereby smaller 
companies performed better compared to larger companies due to lower 
business costs that incurred and less complexity. Based on the results 
found by previous researchers, it shows that there is a relationship between 
company size and firm performance. Hence, the following hypothesis 
has been developed for the relationship between company size and firm 
performance;
H5: There is a significant relationship between company size and 
firm performance after the 2012 MCCG revision
methoDology
The sample companies for this study were selected based on random 100 
Bursa Malaysia listed companies on 1st July 2015. However, banking and 
financial institutions were excluded due to different regulations. Five 
consecutive years of annual reports for these 100 sample firms from 2010 
– 2014 as the study period were examined from Bursa Malaysia’s website.
The final 500 firm- year observations were finally identified for further
testing to meet the research objectives.
In order to determine the relationship of ownership and performance 
of the sample companies pre and post MCCG 2012 revision, the following 
model was developed. 
ROA = β0 + β1FamOwn + β2ManOwn + β3GovOwn + β4InsOwn + 
β5Size + ε  
(1)
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Return on asset (ROA) was computed based on net profit to total 
assets. Family ownership was computed based on the proportion of shares 
owned by family members on the board to the total number of shares 
issued. Managerial ownership was based on the proportion of shares held 
by executive and non-independent directors including their deemed interests 
to the total number of shares issued. Government ownership, on the other 
hand, reflected the proportion of shares held by government agencies or 
government arms to the total number of shares issued while institutional 
ownership was the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors 
to the total number of shares issued. This study controlled the effect of 
companies’ size that was proxy by total asset.
finDings anD analyses
pearson correlation matrix
The results in Table 2 show that government ownership and institutional 
ownership is strongly correlated at 0.663 with a positive association. This 
result implies that government ownership among the sample companies 
is via the institutional shareholding. However, there is no significant 
relationship recorded among the ownership variables to the performance 
of companies (ROA). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) asserted that careful 
attention should be given when two explanatories have a correlation of 0.7 
or higher. Other studies have regarded the correlations of 0.8 or 0.9 among 
independent variables as an indication of a significant multicollinearity 
problem (Griffiths & Judge, 1992). The correlation matrix in table 2 to 
table 6 shows no correlation between explanatory variables exceeding the 
level of 0.6. Thus, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient results suggest no 
collinearity problems between the variables.
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table 1: pearson correlations
variables roa famown manown govown insown
ROA -
FamOwn -.146 -
ManOwn -.014 .277 -
GovOwn -.044 .112 .055 -
InsOwn .030 .144 .139 .663** -
Size .173 -.088 .058 .196 .196
Note: Firm-year observations = 500, *p < 0.05 (2-tailed), ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed). ROA is net profit to total assets. FamOwn 
is the proportion of shares owned by family members on the board to the total number of shares issued. ManOwn is 
the shares held by executive and non-independent directors including their deemed interests to the total number of 
shares issued. GovOwn is the shares held by government agencies or government arms to the total number of shares 
issued. InsOwn is the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors to the total number of shares issued. Size 
is the total asset.
multivariate analysis
Both normality and multicollinearity concerns of the dependent and 
independent variables were checked as a prerequisite before multiple 
regression analyses were conducted. The descriptive analyses showed that 
the dependent variable and some of the continuous independent variables 
are not normally distributed through their skewness and kurtosis values for 
all five years. Consistent with the approach that was suggested by (Cooke, 
1998), both the independent variables and dependent variables had been 
transformed to the normal scores so that their statistical analyses would 
be meaningful and efficient. The study also checked the multicollinearity 
among the independent variables using Pearson correlations in which 
there was no multicollinearity suspected among the independent 
variables based on the cut-off figure of 0.7 variance inflation factor 
(VIF) and tolerance values for all five years. 
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table 2: multivariate results
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Variable
Constant .002 .003 .003 .003 .002
(3.156) (5.533) (4.642) (4.663) (3.016)
FamOwn .003 -.007* .009 -.003 -.005
(.965) (-1.845) (2.690) (-.612) (-1.270)
ManOwn -.001 -.003 -.004 -.001 .000
(-.326) (-1.128) (-.1.190) (-.290) (.029)
GovOwn -.003 .006** .001 .001 -.004
(-.783) (2.126) (.170) (.379) (-1.080)
InsOwn .001 -.008*** .002 -.002 .002
(.460) (-3.254) (.683) (-1.043) (.892)
Size .014* .007 -.009 -.000 .103
(1.768) (.901) (-1.141) (.032) (1.569)
Adj R2 4.8 13.9 9.2 2.2 5.9
Note: Firm-year observations = 500, *p < 0.05 (2-tailed), ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed). ROA is net profit to total assets. FamOwn 
is the proportion of shares owned by family members on the board to the total number of shares issued. ManOwn is 
the shares held by executive and non-independent directors including their deemed interests tothe total number of 
shares issued. GovOwn is the shares held by government agencies or government arms to thetotal number of shares 
issued. InsOwn is the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors tothe total number of shares issued. Size 
is the total asset.
Table 2 shows the multiple regression results for ROA for the financial 
year of 2010. The multiple regression models obtained an adjusted R² of 
4.8 percent. The explanatory power of this study captures about 4.8 percent 
of the variation of firm profitability and suggests the extent to which the 
present set of independent variables can explain the dependent variable. 
The results show that none of the ownership structures are statistically 
significant in relation to firm performance in 2010 for ROA. However, the 
company characteristic variable which is company size has a significant 
positive relationship with firm performance. Hence, there is no significant 
relationship between ownership structures and firm performance prior to 
the revision of MCCG 2012 for the financial year of 2010 except for the 
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company size. The result is consistent with prior study by (Haji, 2014) 
who found an insignificant relationship between ownership structures 
and firm performance. The result is also consistent with a prior study 
done by (Desoky & Mousa, 2013) who found an insignificant relationship 
between ownership structures and firm performance. This implies the lack 
of ownership concentration among Malaysian public listed companies in 
that period where most high profitable companies require a more diffused 
ownership structure rather than complicated ownership structure. Apart 
from that, MCCG 2007 emphasized mainly on the roles of the board of 
directors, audit committees and internal audit function rather than guidance 
for the ownership structures of the company. However, the results show 
a significant relationship between company size and firm performance at 
a 10 percent level. This result is consistent with (Haji, 2014) who found 
a positive association between company size and firm performances. This 
implies that companies with more assets-oriented are able to generate higher 
profit which leads to a good performance.
Table 2 also shows the multiple regression results for ROA for the 
financial year of 2011. The multiple regression models obtained adjusted 
R² of 13.9 percent. This is similar to the results found for the financial year 
of 2010.The explanatory powers of this study capture about 13.9 percent 
of the variation of firm profitability and suggest the extent to which the 
present set of independent variables can explain the dependent variable. The 
results show the significant positive association between some ownership 
structures for family ownership, government ownership and institutional 
ownership with firm performance at 10 percent level, 5 percent level and 
1 percent level respectively for the financial year of 2011. Hence, there are 
significant positive relationships between family ownership, government 
ownership and institutional ownership with firm performance prior to 
the revision of MCCG 2012 for the financial year of 2011. This result is 
consistent with (Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 2014) and (Shyu, 2011) who 
found a significant positive relationship between family ownership and 
firm performances. This implies that the family members are motivated to 
increase their family’s wealth by increasing the firm performance and these 
family companies are concerned in their sustainability and heritage as part of 
their family’s welfare. Besides that, the result also found significant positive 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance. This 
significant positive relationship has been supported in prior studies by (Mohd 
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Ghazali, 2010) and (Desoky & Mousa, 2013) who found the association 
between government ownership and firm performance. This implies that 
the government linked companies normally receive favorable treatment 
by the government pertaining to the government policies relating to their 
business operations. Apart from that, these government linked companies 
are more in the good chance of winning the government profitable projects. 
Furthermore, the result also found significant positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm performance. The positive association 
between institutional ownership and firm performance has been supported in 
the prior studies by (Desoky & Mousa, 2013), (Alipour, 2013) and (Arouri, 
Hossain & Muttakin, 2014). This significant positive finding implies the 
effective monitoring role by the institutional shareholders who are able to 
reduce the conflict of interest between management and shareholders as 
well as able to reduce the management’s self-perquisite behavior. Hence, 
institutional shareholders are one of the good tools in disciplining the 
management so that they act in the best interest of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
Table 2 also shows the multiple regression results for ROA for the 
financial year of 2012 which is the pre period of the MCCG 2012 revision. 
The multiple regression models show an adjusted R² of 9.2 percent. The 
higher adjusted R² for the financial year is captured at about 9.2 percent of 
the variation of firm profitability and suggest the extent to which the current 
set of dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables. 
Similar with the result for pre period of MCCG 2012 revision for financial 
year 2011, family ownership has shown significant positive relationship 
with firm performance at 1 percent level. The result has confirmed prior 
the finding by (Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 2014) and (Shyu, 2011) who 
found significant positive relationship between family ownership and firm 
performances. This is consistent with the requirement in the MCCG 2012 
where all directors in Malaysian public listed companies must declare 
their family relationship among board members and major shareholders. 
This implies that family owned companies have better matching of control 
rights of the dominant shareholders with their cash flow rights that result 
in higher incentives for control to be exercised in order to maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth. 
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Additionally, Table 2 shows the multiple regression results for ROA 
for the financial year of 2013 which is the period where the MCCG 2012 
revision took effect and all public listed companies were required to comply 
with it. The multiple regression models show an adjusted R² of 2.2 percent. 
This adjusted R² for this financial year captures about 2.2 percent of the 
variation of firm profitability and suggests the extent to which the current 
set of independent variables can explain the dependent variable. The result 
shows that none of the ownership structures have significant relationship 
with firm performance for the post period of MCCG 2012 for the financial 
year end in 2013. The insignificant relationship between ownership 
structures and firm performance is consistent with the prior study by (Haji, 
2014) who found insignificant association between ownership structures 
and firm performance. This implies the risk of attitude among public listed 
companies in Malaysia that mostly invest their assets on low risk projects 
that promise lower returns. Similar to the ownership structures, the company 
size also does not have any significant relationship with firm performance. 
This implies that the companies with huge assets normally have higher 
liabilities in financing the assets that affect the cash flow of companies and 
hence distort their profitability.
Table 2 further shows the multiple regression results for ROA for the 
financial year 2014 which is the post period of the MCCG 2012 revision. The 
multiple regression models show an adjusted R² of 5.9 percent. This adjusted 
R² for the financial year captures about 5.9 percent of the variation of firm 
profitability and this suggests the extent to which the current set of dependent 
variable can be explained by the independent variables. The result shows 
that none of the ownership structures have significant relationship with 
firm performance for the post period of MCCG 2012 for the financial year 
end in 2014. The insignificant relationship between ownership structures 
and firm performance is consistent with the prior study by (Alipour, 2013) 
who found insignificant association between ownership structures and firm 
performance that was represented through return on asset (ROA). However, 
the study by (Alipour, 2013) has been conducted for Iran listed companies 
and this study is conducted based on the Malaysian environment. Hence, 
there will be different factors that result in insignificant results. Based on 
the Malaysian environment, the unfavorable results between ownership 
structures and firm performance implies the two air tragedies that happened 
in years 2013 and 2014 for two aircrafts that belonged to the Malaysian 
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Airline System (MAS). These incidents have become world news and 
affected the Malaysian stock market due to impairment of foreign investors’ 
confidence in their investment to Malaysian companies. Similar to the 
ownership structures, the company size also gives unfavorable result for 
the relationship with firm performance. This implies that the companies 
with huge assets are not able to generate higher profit due to the two air 
tragedies in Malaysia that distort the international market.
Thus, based on the results of Table 2, it can be concluded that only 
H1, H3 and H4 are accepted since only family, government and institutional 
ownership are significant to company performance which is represented by 
the company size in this study.
concluDing remarKs
As the overall results for five years of multivariate analysis, there are 
significant relationships found between ownership structures and firm 
performance for pre periods of MCCG 2012 revision. The pre periods 
of the MCCG 2012 revision for the financial year of 2010 till 2012 
have shown a significant relationship for family ownership, government 
ownership, institutional ownership and company size with respect to the 
firm’s performances. Meanwhile, the post periods of MCCG 2012 revision 
for the financial years of 2013 and 2014 have not shown any significant 
relationship for ownership structures and company size with respect to the 
firm performance. The significant positive relationship between family 
ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership with respect 
to firm performance for the pre periods have further confirmed the studies 
by (Desoky & Mousa, 2013), (Alipour, 2013), (Arouri, Hossain & Muttakin, 
2014) and (Shyu, 2011).  In terms of relationship between company size 
and firm performance, the favorable result for pre period of MCCG 2012 
revision has further confirmed the findings by (Haji, 2014). In contrast, 
insignificant relationship for ownership structures and company size with 
respect to firm performance for post periods of MCCG 2012 revision for 
both financial years 2013 and 2014 are due to unfavorable Malaysian stock 
market in both years 2013 and 2014. This has been the result of the two 
aircrafts tragedies in Malaysia for MH370 and MH17 that have impaired the 
confidence of foreign investors to invest into the Malaysian stock market. 
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All four ownership structures and one company characteristic have 
been tested in this study. Using descriptive analysis, the study found that 
the level of corporate governance practices is high after the MCCG 2012 
revision. By employing the multiple regression models for multivariate 
analysis, the study found that family ownership, government ownership, 
institutional ownership and company size have significant positive 
relationships with firm performances for pre periods of the MCCG 2012 
revision. Upon mandatory compliance of MCCG 2012 for post periods, the 
study did not find a significant relationship between ownership structures 
and firm performances due to unfavorable Malaysian stock market for both 
years 2013 and 2014. Pre periods of the MCCG 2012 revision have shown 
that family ownership, government ownership, institutional ownership 
and company size have significant influence on the firm’s performances 
due to the common nature of listed companies in Malaysia that are family 
companies and government linked companies besides the companies that 
are mostly owned by the institutional shareholders. However, no significant 
influence found between all independent variables and firm performance is 
mainly due to the unhealthy Malaysian stock market environment after the 
two aircrafts tragedies that happened and brought to the world’s attention 
and this has indirectly impaired the foreign investors’ confidence. 
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